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HERE ARE 5 WAYS TO DETECT PRO-CHINA PROPAGANDA

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Chinese Coast Guard ship uses water cannons against Philippine Coast Guard and Bureau of Fisheries and Aquatic Resources vessels during a humanitarian mission to Filipino fishing boats in Bajo de Masinloc on April 30, 2024. — PHOTO FROM PHILIPPINE COAST GUARD

Last March, several prominent pro-Duterte vloggers and influencers admitted in a congressional hearing that they had attended a China-funded training seminar in 2023. Former presidential communications secretary Trixie Cruz-Angeles confirmed that she and bloggers Mark Lopez, Tio Moreno, Philstar.com columnist Pia Morato, and lawyer Ahmed Paglinawan took part in a two-week program in Beijing run by China’s National Radio and Television Administration.

The revelation crystallized what researchers and journalists had long suspected: China is actively working to shape Filipino public opinion through social media influencers. The Philippines and China remain locked in a bitter territorial dispute over the West Philippine Sea.

These operations first became evident in 2020, under then President Rodrigo Duterte, who pivoted the country toward Beijing. Analysts found a coordinated disinformation network composed of 155 accounts with 130,000 followers and millions of interactions that promoted pro-China politicians including Rodrigo and Sara Duterte and Imee Marcos. Facebook subsequently took down these pages, saying they originated from China. 

Since then, Chinese influence operations have gotten smarter and slicker. A recent Reuters investigation revealed that the Chinese Embassy hired a Manila-based, Chinese-owned firm to boost China messaging using fake accounts and a fake news page. Other recent research has surfaced a consistent pattern: Pro-Duterte influencer content tends to favor China. A 2024 AidData report found that Beijing “[uses] intermediaries to shape or convey its narratives without direct attribution.”

Filipinos tend to resist pro-China content that looks inorganic. In 2020, the Chinese embassy produced a music video showcasing Beijing’s assistance to the Philippines during the pandemic. The video generated so much online hate and it became apparent that pro-China content would be more effective if it featured Filipino talking heads and voices. 

It is difficult to ascertain whether pro-Duterte, pro-China influencers are acting independently or are instead contracted by political clients. They may also be incentivized to produce content that they can monetize on social media platforms. Moreover, attendance in state-sponsored programs does not mean the attendee is a foreign state asset.  

Whatever their motivation, these influencers produce content and propagate discourse that confuses the public with pseudo-intellectual and misleading analysis. They sow fear and distrust and, even if they cannot successfully rehabilitate China’s image, they may be able to convince their followers to keep voting for pro-China local politicians.

The following are “red flags” signalling content that, whether deliberately or not, effectively functions as pro-China propaganda. 

1. Do they echo Beijing’s claims to the West Philippine Sea?

Perhaps the biggest indicator of pro-China leaning is the repetition of official thought from Beijing. For example, in a now restricted June 2024 Facebook post, Tio Moreno—among the pro-Duterte personalities trained in Beijing—posted a defense of China’s nine-dash line.

However, Moreno’s arguments have long been rebutted. In 2016, an international arbitral tribunal ruled overwhelmingly in favor of the Philippines, invalidating China’s sweeping “nine-dash line” over nearly the entire West Philippine Sea. In its defense, the Philippines presented various maps, including state-sanctioned ones from China that showed its southern border reached only as far as Hainan, lending credence to the idea that the nine-dash line was a more contemporary invention.

In addition, stone markers allegedly erected by China in 1902 on the Paracel Islands were actually found to be fake. Retired Supreme Court Associate Justice Antonio Carpio obtained a copy of the confidential report exposing this in a now out-of-print book in a secondhand bookstore in Beijing, and it was included in the Philippines’ defense.

2. Are they hypercritical of the United States, but never call out China?

Anti-American sentiment has deep roots in the Philippines. Criticism of US imperialism isn’t inherently propaganda—it often reflects legitimate grievances. The United States colonized the Philippines for nearly half a century and supported the Marcos dictatorship. More recent incidents, like the 2014 killing of transgender Filipino, Jennifer Laude, by US Marine Joseph Pemberton, have fueled resentment. 

During the pandemic, Reuters revealed, the US ran a covert campaign, creating hundreds of fake social media accounts impersonating Filipinos to discredit China’s Sinovac vaccine in the Philippines, undermining public health efforts.

But Beijing has weaponized this historical grievance to advance its own interests. A consistent talking point in Chinese propaganda frames the Philippines as an American “puppet” or “vassal” state—Cold War-era language that strips the Philippines of agency in its own territorial disputes.

The tell-tale sign of pro-China propaganda isn’t criticism of the United States—it’s the glaring double standard. Pro-Duterte influencers regularly condemn American “imperialism” while remaining conspicuously silent about China’s own expansionist actions: building artificial islands on Philippine-claimed reefs, ramming Philippine Coast Guard vessels, deploying water cannons against Filipino sailors, and driving fishermen from their traditional grounds.

Philstar.com investigation, for example, tracked six pro-Duterte YouTube vloggers, who portrayed US military exercises with the Philippines as provocative while downplaying China’s militarization of disputed waters.

Lawyer Ahmed Paglinawan, who co-runs the Facebook page Luminous with former presidential press secretary Trixie Cruz-Angeles, exemplified this deflection in a February 2025 post. The lawyer, who also attended the Beijing training, dismissed concerns about Chinese expansionism by arguing that China has “so much vacant land” within its borders. “Tingin ko, yung mga taong praning na sasakupin na ng China ang WPS, Palawan, buong Pilipinas, lahat ng oceans, at pati na ang buwan, ay di pa nakapunta sa China,” Paglinawan wrote. “Kaya tigilan na yang kaka-walwal na ganyan. Ignorante lang ang nagpapaniwala sa ganyan.

(Translation: My view is, those who are paranoid that China plans to conquer the West Philippine Sea, Palawan, the whole Philippines, all the oceans, and even the moon have never been to China. China has so much vacant land… So stop this worrying. Only the ignorant fall for that.)

The argument ignores a basic fact: China’s actions in the West Philippine Sea aren’t about needing more land, but about controlling strategic waters, resources, and trade routes. By framing legitimate security concerns as paranoid hysteria, influencers like Paglinawan discourage Filipinos from being vigilant about their territorial rights.

3. Do they swing between downplaying and exaggerating China’s threat, depending on what helps their narrative?

Pro-China influencers employ a contradictory but deliberate strategy: They minimize China’s aggressive actions when convenient, then pivot to catastrophic fearmongering when it serves their purpose. The goal isn’t consistency—it’s confusion and paralysis. By simultaneously telling Filipinos that China poses no threat and that resisting China will lead to devastating war, influencers create a psychological trap: Either concerns about Chinese aggression are overblown paranoia, or acting on those concerns will bring disaster.

Downplaying the threat. A January 2024 study by political economist and sociologist Alvin Camba documented how influencers cherry-pick and misrepresent academic arguments to downplay China’s aggression. In one example, influencer Sass Rogando Sasot posted only the abstract of a 2017 academic paper about Chinese fishing fleets in disputed waters. The paper discussed how local Chinese governments coordinate fishing boats and suggested that international observers might be overemphasizing the military dimensions of these activities. Sasot used this to argue that US and Filipino concerns were overblown, treating a complex situation as an exaggerated military threat.

But Sasot conveniently ignored crucial context. The paper was written in 2017, before China had dramatically escalated its activities. By the time she posted it years later, China had built artificial islands with military installations, the Chinese Navy and Coast Guard had become far more aggressive, and Chinese vessels were regularly using water cannons and blocking maneuvers against Filipino ships. The paper’s nuanced analysis was outdated for current realities, but Sasot presented it as proof that current concerns were manufactured hysteria. The message: Filipinos worried about Chinese aggression are simply falling for Western propaganda and overreacting to normal fishing activities.

Excessive fearmongering. But when Filipinos criticize China’s actions, the same influencers suddenly pivot to doomsday warnings. In a January 6, 2025, post, Mark Anthony Lopez—who also attended the Beijing-sponsored content seminar in 2023—claimed the Philippines was “a target for nuclear annihilation” and “doomed to oblivion” following the Balikatan exercises. The US-Philippine war games are an annual event. These narratives are alarmist and defeatist, designed to scare the public from pushback against China.

The fearmongering also extends to exaggerating economic consequences. In a January 25, 2025, post, Lopez claimed Sinophobia was being used as a tactic, “kahit na ang magiging dulot nito sa ating ekonomiya at international relations ay makakasama para bansa, at lalung magpapahirap sa atin (even if this would only hurt our economy and international relations and worsen the country, and make us poorer).”

This narrative relies on exaggerating Philippine dependence on China. Camba’s research shows reality is more complex. During the administration of President Benigno Aquino III, while Philippines-China relations were severely strained over maritime disputes, Chinese foreign direct investment actually increased because of the strength of the Philippine economy. When China briefly restricted Philippine banana imports and tourism in retaliation, these sectors represented only a tiny fraction of overall trade. China did not ban imports of Philippine nickel and other resources because China needed them too. Trade is a two-way street; the Philippines has more economic leverage than influencers acknowledge.

4. Do they weaponize Sinophobia to shut down criticism?

Another tactic pro-China influencers use is falsely accusing critics of racism. By conflating legitimate criticism of the Chinese government’s actions with prejudice against Chinese people, these influencers attempt to shut down all debate about China’s behavior in Philippine waters. The strategy is deliberately confusing: They blur the line between criticizing a state and attacking an ethnic group, making it appear that any objection to China’s territorial aggression is actually bigotry against Chinese people.

This is textbook deflection. Using racial slurs against Chinese people is indeed Sinophobic and wrong. But criticizing China’s water cannon attacks on Filipino sailors, its blocking of Philippine supply missions, or its militarization of disputed reefs is a legitimate response to violations of Philippine sovereignty. The Chinese government and the Chinese people are not the same thing.

In the January 25 post, Lopez accuses Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) chief Romeo Brawner of instituting “Sinophobia.” In another post on January 30, 2025, Tio Moreno mocked former Gabriela Women’s Party representative Arlene Brosas: “Yong galit ka sa China at mga Chinese pero nagcecelebrate ka ng Chinese New Year (You’re angry at China and the Chinese but you celebrate Chinese New Year).”

Celebrating Chinese New Year—a cultural tradition embraced by many Filipinos of Chinese descent and non-Chinese Filipinos alike—has nothing to do with opposing the Chinese government’s territorial aggression. The Filipino-Chinese community is an integral part of Philippine society, and many Filipino-Chinese citizens themselves oppose China’s actions in the West Philippine Sea.

Military historian Jose Custodio noted that the talk point is a “carryover of the Duterte era.” Its main idea is that if you are critical of China, then “you shouldn’t buy China products.” This idea was recently floated by acting Davao Mayor Sebastian Duterte, and refuted by Coast Guard spokesman Commodore Jay Tarriela as “false equivalence.” By suggesting that criticizing Beijing means rejecting Chinese culture, influencers create a false choice designed to silence or intimidate dissent.

5. Do they exaggerate military discord and civil instability, and smear nonpartisan military and security professionals?

Undermining the credibility and cohesion of the Philippine military serves a clear strategic purpose for China: If Filipinos don’t trust their own armed forces, they are less likely to support government efforts to defend territorial claims in the West Philippine Sea. Pro-China influencers pursue this goal through two complementary tactics—fabricating stories about military instability and systematically attacking the reputations of those in the defense sector who refuse to advance pro-China narratives.

In late September 2024, the AFP publicly rebuffed multiple false claims circulating on social media about instability within military ranks. One fabricated narrative alleged that internal divisions were emerging around anti-corruption rallies. Another even more outrageous claim—which the military called a “vile and malicious fabrication”—alleged that the CIA was backing a coup plot involving the military and defense secretary. These weren’t random conspiracy theories; they follow patterns consistent with coordinated disinformation campaigns.

A 2024 Philstar.com investigation documented how Chinese social media accounts amplified content about potential civil war when former president Duterte threatened that Mindanao should secede from the Philippines. By boosting secessionist rhetoric and civil war fears, these information operations aim to create the impression that the Philippines is on the verge of collapse—a fragmented, unstable country incapable of defending its territorial interests. If Filipinos believe their nation is falling apart, they are more likely to accept the argument that confronting China is reckless and accommodation is the only safe path forward.

Military historian Jose Custodio said this narrative is an attempt to agitate the military, as well as “paint a picture to the public that the Marcos administration is suffering instability in a hope to lower its approval rating.” However, this has largely been successfully dispelled by official military statements and a lack of a critical mass supportive of the Dutertes.

Beyond fabricating instability, influencers systematically target individual military and security officials who have been most effective in exposing Chinese aggression. The Philippine Coast Guard’s transparency campaign—documenting Chinese water cannon attacks, blocking maneuvers, and harassment with photos and videos—has been particularly successful in building international support for the Philippines. Officers like Coast Guard spokesman Tarriela, who pioneered this “assertive transparency” approach, have become prime targets for character assassination. A pro-China website, for example, tagged Tarriela as a “tainted source, PMA reject, CIA operative, US dog.”

While these attacks have not seemed to dent public support for Philippine claims in the West Philippine Sea, this form of influence can be sticky for the pro-Duterte supporter base or confusing to casual doomscrollers who have not kept abreast of geopolitical developments. Custodio said that while Filipino audiences may be skeptical of China today, China “plays the long game”—so disinformation is a long-term threat.

“The Philippines, throughout history, has always produced traitors. They are a dime a dozen,” said Custodio. “We will always be fertile ground for China operations. That’s why we need vigilance.”—PCIJ.org

First published in CoverStory — October 31, 2025

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Crime

EX-POLICE INTELLIGENCE OFFICER IS CONVICTED IN DUTERTE-ERA DRUG WAR KILLING

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Families of EJK victims, accompanied by lawyer Kristina Conti (second from left), rally outside the National Bureau of Investigation last April 4, after filing a petition urging the NBI to probe the online harassment and threats they’ve faced since the arrest of Rodrigo Duterte on March 11. — PHOTOS BY BULLIT MARQUEZ

Nearly a decade after the deed, a police intelligence officer in then President Rodrigo Duterte’s administration has been convicted of homicide for the death of a drug suspect in Baguio City in July 2016.

It is only the fifth known conviction related to Duterte’s “war on drugs” that has resulted in the extrajudicial killing (EJK) of tens of thousands of mostly poor Filipinos. The government’s formal estimate is 6,000, but rights groups peg the number at 30,000. The former president is now in the custody of the International Criminal Court (ICC) in The Hague, awaiting the confirmation of charges late this month.

“Evil never wins in the end,” Kristina Conti, human rights lawyer and counsel for the drug war victims in the case at the ICC, told CoverStory on Monday. She described the conviction of Police Col. Dante Lubos as a rare victory against impunity.

In an Aug. 22 ruling, a copy of which was obtained by CoverStory, the Baguio City Regional Trial Court Branch 60 sentenced Lubos to up to 14 years in prison for the killing of Ryan Dave Almora, then 33, in a buy-bust operation in the victim’s house in the summer capital.

Presiding Judge Rufus Gayo Malecdan Jr. ordered Lubos, who headed Baguio’s Central Intelligence Unit at the time of the buy-bust operation, to pay Almora’s family about ₱1.45 million in damages, lawyer’s fees, and civil indemnity.

In a public Facebook post on Monday, Lubos’ lawyer Francis Camtugan said his client is innocent.

Lubos now serves as chief of the regional intelligence unit of the Police Regional Office 3. He was also previously assigned at the police provincial offices of La Union and Nueva Vizcaya.

He is the highest-ranking police officer to be convicted in Duterte’s war on drugs.

‘Nanlaban killings’

Citing two expert witnesses presented by the prosecution, Judge Malecdan said Almora’s injuries “did not indicate that he was in a position to fight back against Lubos” and the latter’s team.

Conti said the conviction “shows how ‘nanlaban killings’ are utterly wrong and criminal.” She was referring to the common claim of police officers that the suspects had resisted arrest—“nanlaban”—leading to their being killed. 

“The community of human rights defenders are heartened that police narratives are interrogated well during trial, and that opens the door for other incidents to be investigated and prosecuted. Unfortunately, being able to bring these killings to court is more the exception than the rule,” Conti said.

Per the court ruling, Almora was first hit in the abdomen, causing him to fall to the ground on his back. He was then shot again in the right chest. Based on the trajectory of the second bullet, the shooter was standing over Almora, the court said.

Lubos had admitted shooting Almora during the police operation, saying it was “necessary under the circumstances and in the performance of [his] official duty.”

One of the expert witnesses, medico-legal officer Dr. Jaime Leal, said Almora was already dead when the third shot was fired at him, this time in the left chest.

Andrew Bacayan, another expert witness from the National Bureau of Investigation, said the trajectory of the bullet from the upper side of the body to the lumbar area indicated that Almora “was on his knees pleading for his life when he was shot.”

“Notwithstanding these two different versions, one fact remains clear: Almora was in a defenseless and compromised position when he was shot and killed, contrary to the accused’s claim that Almora was firing shots at him when he (Almora) was shot by the accused,” Judge Malecdan said in the ruling.

“This strongly supports the prosecution’s claim that Almora committed no unlawful aggression either toward [Jerry] Silawon, the civilian informant, and the accused at the time he was shot and killed,” the judge added.

An ‘overkill’?

Relatives attend the inurnment of six more EJK victims at the “Dambana ng Paghilom” (Shrine of Healing) in Caloocan City on Aug. 28.

In December 2017, then Supreme Court Justice Samuel Martires cited the operation against Almora, pointing out that the Philippine National Police had sent eight units just to arrest the drug suspect.

“There were two police chief inspectors involved, eight units from the PNP in a buy-bust operation. Was this not an overkill? Eight units, not eight personnel, eight units. Meaning to say, eight different units from the Philippine National Police,” Martires said then.

Malecdan noted in his ruling that Lubos, who was supposedly crouched earlier behind a wall 12 meters away, said he had entered Almora’s doorway, identified himself as a police officer, and returned fire after Almora shot at him several times, killing Almora with three shots.

The judge rejected this account, saying there was no evidence that Almora had fired at Lubos or his team.

Almora tested negative in a paraffin test, and no bullet slugs or bullet holes were found at the crime scene, indicating “the likelihood that Almora did not in fact fire shots at the time,” Malecdan said. 

The defense also failed to prove that the .22 MRF Astra pistol allegedly found near Almora’s body was registered in his name, the judge said, adding: “No fingerprints of the victim were recovered from the handgun.”

Brig. Gen. Randulf Tuaño, the PNP public information chief and spokesperson, did not immediately respond to CoverStory’s request for comment on the latest development involving a police official.

Appeal

“We maintain the innocence of our client,” Lubos’ lawyer Camtugan said on FB, adding that they had already filed a notice of appeal.

“The Court did not apply the dreaded OCA 163-2013 but only required us to post additional bond (which we immediately complied [with], minutes before we filed the notice of appeal),” he said.

The OCA 163-2013 directs all trial court judges to order the transfer of convicted persons to the New Bilibid Prison even if a motion for reconsideration or an appeal is pending.

Lubos “remains in active duty and he is one of the best police officer[s] we ever met,” Camtugan said. “We shall fight till the fat lady sings.”

The lawyer also said the case against Lubos had earlier been downgraded from murder to homicide, [and that the charges against the other defendants numbering over 40 had already been dismissed.

“Our client was the remaining defendant,” he said.

According to Conti, “it is also telling that the decision concludes that this is an unintentional killing (homicide), contrary to our position that [‘nanlaban killings’] are premeditated.”

Camtugan said that as of Monday, “we are waiting for the elevation of the case files to the Court of Appeals and for the letter from the Chief Records Officer of the appellate court to direct us to file briefs (defense, private complainant, and the Office of the Solicitor General).”

‘Small fry, not big fish’

The conviction of Lubos is the fifth known drug conviction after separate courts issued guilty verdicts on the police officers involved in the killing of Kian Loyd delos Santos, then 17, in August 2017; Carl Arnaiz and Reynaldo “Kulot” de Guzman in the same year; and Luis Bonifacio and his son Gabriel in 2016.

In the Arnaiz-De Guzman case, Patrolman Jeffrey Perez was convicted of torture and planting of evidence in 2022, and of murder in 2023.

“In the context of the ICC case against Duterte, we think this will reinforce the premise that justice here in the Philippines can be delivered, but against the small fry, not the big fish,” Conti said.

She said the conviction could be additional contextual information for the ICC’s investigation.

“At this stage, they are identifying who are MOST responsible for the killings in the war on drugs, and to get there, they need to know ALL who are responsible,” she said.

Conti believes that Philippine courts open avenues to justice, “but the path to their doors are fraught with uncertainties, frustrations, and even danger.”

She said it is the whole mechanism of accountability that makes the Philippines unable and unwilling to genuinely investigate or prosecute, which the drug war victims have denounced.

According to Conti, the police have poorly investigated crimes and have not identified the participants of crimes, especially those committed during police operations, and that prosecutors have been limited by current jurisprudence on police liabilities in operations.

“Before victims can even get to the courtroom steps, they would have faced a whole array of constraints—financial, logistical, psychological, and yes, even physical,” Conti said.

Asked what factors have prevented other drug cases from prospering, she cited the poor or nonexistent investigation of killings. She said that in police operations, paperwork is missing, and that in vigilante killings, perpetrators are not identified.

“Witnesses are scared, intimidated or, sometimes, dead. Soco (scene of the crime) reports are missing or incomplete. There are no ballistics reports that can pinpoint from which gun a bullet/shell/casing came,” Conti said, adding:

“These cases are being treated as separate crimes instead of being appreciated as part of a whole modus operandi. At this rate, all ‘nanlaban killings’ should be investigated.”

First published in CoverStory – September 3, 2025

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Documentary

FIVE REVEALS FROM THE FLOOD CONTROL DATA

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President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. inspects a ₱55-million “ghost” flood control project in Baliwag, Bulacan, on Aug. 20. The 220-meter concrete riverwall project, marked completed and fully paid by the Department of Public Works and Highways, shows no signs of actual construction, according to Marcos. — PHOTO FROM PCO.GOV.PH

Between July 2022 and May 2025, the first three years of Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s presidency, the government funded 9,855 flood control projects worth over ₱545 billion. We analyzed those projects and the companies that got the contracts to build them. 

Massive flooding in recent months have put these projects in the harsh glare of public scrutiny, with allegations of substandard work and links to corrupt practices. “Mahiya naman kayo,” President Marcos said in his State of the Nation Address in July, shaming contractors and officials involved in kickbacks linked to failed flood control projects. 

In a recent privilege speech, Sen. Panfilo Lacson said that as much as 60% of infrastructure funds could go to “commissions” and off-the-books payments to legislators, public works officials, auditors and others. “The pie-sharing varies depending on the level of greed,” he said.

Here are some takeaways from our analysis of the flood control data. For those interested in corporate and other records linked to flood control projects, the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ) has posted them on this page.

1. Flood control projects fund extravagant lifestyles.

Billionaire couple Pacifico “Curlee” II and Cezarah “Sarah” Discaya can be dubbed the “King and Queen of Flood Control.” The six construction companies founded by the couple and their son bagged 345 solo and joint projects worth a whopping ₱25.2 billion. That’s three times the ₱8.6 billion allocated for “housing and community amenities” in the proposed 2025 budget. No other contractors came close.

But that may not be all. Pasig City Mayor Vico Sotto, who ran against Sarah Discaya last May, has linked three other construction firms to the couple: YPR Gen. Contractor and Construction, Elite General Contractors and Development Corp., and Amethyst Horizon Builders. Curlee Discaya is listed as the chief operating officer of all three. In addition, two of these have joint ventures with Discaya-owned firms.

Taken together, all Discaya-linked companies bagged 421 projects totaling ₱31 billion. That’s more than the annual net revenues clocked by Ayala Land in recent years. (PCIJ obtained Securities and Exchange Commission records for these companies; copies can be found here.) 

The Pasig couple have not been shy about displaying their wealth, recently regaling TV viewers with glimpses of their lavish lifestyle, including their multistory compound bedecked with opulent chandeliers and crystal statues. They also showed off a parking garage with over 40 luxury vehicles, a collection estimated by Philstar.com to be worth between ₱337 million and ₱465 million.

2. It pays to be in Congress, especially if you chair the committee on appropriations.

If the Discayas are the king and queen of flood control, the Co family of Bicol are royalty. Indeed, Claudine Co, described by entertainment site PEP as a vlogger-influencer-singer “known for her travel diaries, fashion hauls, and everyday glimpses of luxury,” lives a royal lifestyle that includes a ₱25-million Mercedes Benz SUV, rides on private planes, and apartment hunting in Paris.

She happens to be a scion of a Bicol political family linked to construction firms that got ₱15.7 billion in flood control contracts between 2022 and 2025, when her uncle, Ako Bicol Rep. Elizaldy Co, chaired the powerful committee on appropriations of the House of Representatives. That committee has immense power in drawing up the national budget, including flood control projects. 

Sunwest Inc., founded by Elizaldy Co and his brother Christopher Co, the former party-list representative who is Claudine’s dad, has ₱10 billion worth of flood control contracts—the biggest allocation of any single firm. 

Christopher Co also formed Hi-Tone Construction and Development Corp., which racked up ₱4.6 billion worth of contracts. Both brothers formally divested from their firms when they were elected to the House. But Rappler reported that Elizaldy Co still has a stake in other companies tied to Sunwest.

Their sister, Albay Vice Gov. Farida Co, owns FS Co Builders and Supply, which got 13 contracts worth ₱1.2 billion, some of which were projects built in partnership with Hi-Tone. 

Members of Claudine’s family have represented Ako Bicol since 2010. The 1987 Constitution had intended the party-list system to give voice to underrepresented and marginalized groups in Congress.

table visualization

3. Congress is investigating flood control contracts but many lawmakers own or are linked to contracting firms or have been accused of getting kickbacks from them.

Both the Senate and the House have launched investigations into anomalous flood control projects.

The Senate blue ribbon committee held its second hearing on Sept. 1, while the House “infrastructure committee” kicks off its first on Sept. 2.

But vocal critics, including some of their colleagues, have questioned Congress’ credibility to probe the matter when lawmakers themselves are tied to contractors. Baguio City Mayor Benjamin Magalong says some lawmakers are paid 30% to 40% of the contract costs by well-connected firms that bag contracts. According to Lacson, some legislators got kickbacks from congressional insertions and unprogrammed appropriations for public works projects in the national budget.

By our count, at least 18 members of the 20th Congress have ownership or other connections to companies that have gotten public works contracts from the government. (Check out the SEC papers obtained by PCIJ here.) 

table visualization

4. Bad contractors can get good contracts.

The best contractors are not necessarily the biggest ones. The 15 contractors who got the largest sums out of the flood control contracts have checkered records.  

Two are facing possible tax audits. One has a previous graft case. Another has been criticized for endangering locals. Over half of the 15 have gotten “poor” (less than 75%) or “unsatisfactory” (75–82%) marks from the Construction Performance Evaluation System (CPES).

The Construction Industry Authority of the Philippines uses the CPES rating system to evaluate construction companies’ performance in government projects.

A poor or unsatisfactory rating should ideally result in a contractor’s disqualification from future biddings, according to the CPES implementing guidelines. A blacklisted firm is automatically delisted when the period for the penalty has lapsed, unless the blacklisting agency requests the Government Procurement Policy Board to maintain the firm’s status.

table visualization

The Discayas’ St. Timothy (No. 6) is one of the contractors of a damaged floodgate that has failed to control flooding in Navotas City. It was also criticized for participating in a joint venture for the supply of election materials in the May 2025 midterm elections, considering its founder Sarah Discaya’s electoral bid. The firm was pressured to pull out from the deal at the last minute.

St. Timothy and three more Discaya firms—Alpha & Omega (No. 5), St. Matthew (No. 17), and St. Gerrard (No. 50)—were also the subjects of a Bureau of Internal Revenue tax investigation, upheld by the Court of Tax Appeals in 2022. The BIR and the Bureau of Customs have recently also announced investigations into the couple’s financial records.

The Co-linked Sunwest and Hi-Tone have both received poor and unsatisfactory ratings, the former for the rehabilitation of a wharf in Tabaco, Albay, and the latter for the upgrade of a wharf in Legazpi City and the construction of a road leading to Romblon’s airport. 

The Cos’ Sunwest projects, in particular, have been found to be subpar, suspicious, or in violation of regulations, including:

  • In 2012, the Commission on Audit found that a road it built was short of 2,000 square meters.
  • In 2020, the Mines and Geosciences Bureau flagged Sunwest and 14 other companies for violating quarrying permits. The agency eventually cleared them and allowed the resumption of their activities. 
  • In 2021, the firm was investigated for medical supply contracts with the government during the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. Senators said it was “suspicious” for a construction company to venture into such a deal.
  • In 2021, Sunwest entered into a contract with the Department of Education to supply laptops for teachers. In July 2025, the Office of the Ombudsman charged former top education officials for procuring overpriced and outdated laptops from Sunwest and two other firms.
  • Civil society groups in Western Visayas claimed that Sunwest’s ₱2.6-billion road project in the region poses risks to the biodiverse Central Panay Mountain Range. 

Other contractors among the top 15 have also been called out, including:

  • Equi-Parco (No.9), based in Agusan del Norte and founded by former Butuan mayor Ronnie Vicente Lagnada, has received two unsatisfactory or poor ratings. 
  • Legacy (No. 2), whose owner, Alex Abelido, was accused of violating the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act over a waterworks contract with the town of Valencia in Negros Oriental in 2000 but was eventually acquitted. Legacy has the worst record among all 15 firms, with at least four poor or unsatisfactory CPES ratings. It is followed by Road Edge Development Services (No. 14) which had three records, while EGB (No. 3), M.G. Samidan Construction (No. 11) and L.R. Tiqui Builders (No. 12) had at least one poor or unsatisfactory evaluation each. 
  • Some projects of QM Builders have been embroiled in controversy, including accusations of causing a landslide, a flash flood, and displacement of locals.

5. Flood-prone areas in Mindanao got the least number and amount of projects.

Funding for the 10 most flood-prone provinces identified by the Mines and Geosciences Bureau is uneven, with Luzon provinces getting more than those in Mindanao, despite being smaller in size and, in some cases, less vulnerable to floods. 

table visualization

The fifth most vulnerable areas in the country, Maguindanao del Norte and Sur, got ₱2.4 billion. Metro Manila, which is 16 times smaller and less flood-prone, got 20 times the two provinces’ funding.

In fact, the nation’s capital, together with Bulacan, gobbled up 15% of the funding for flood control structures built in the first three years of the Marcos Jr. administration. All projects in Metro Manila have a price tag of ₱52.5 billion, while those in Bulacan are valued at ₱43.7 billion. 

Only these two areas got funding of more than ₱30 billion.

Isabela and Cebu each had a budget of between ₱20 billion and ₱30 billion. Meanwhile, 13 provinces had budgets of between ₱10 billion and ₱20 billion: Tarlac, Camarines Sur, Albay, Pampanga, Leyte, Pangasinan, Misamis Oriental, La Union, Oriental Mindoro, Negros Occidental, Cavite, Davao del Sur, and Ilocos Norte.Sixty-four remaining provinces had a budget of ₱10 million and below, while Tawi-Tawi is the only province with no listed flood control project over the last three years. — WITH RESEARCH BY CHRISTIAN CHUA

First published in CoverStory – September 2, 2025

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